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POINT I 
THE DRAINAGE FEES IMPOSED BY THE COUNTY FLOOD CONTROL 
ORDINANCE ARE THE SUBSTANTIVE EQUIVALENT OF ASSESSMENTS 
IMPOSED UNDER SECTION 17-7-16 OF THE COUNTY IMPROVEMENT 
DISTRICT ACT. 
In Point II of its Brief, the County admits that had it 
funded its flood control facilities under Utah's "County 
Improvement District Act," Utah Code Ann. § 17-7-1 through 
§ 17-7-39, any fees imposed thereunder would constitute 
assessments from which the Granite School District is exempt. 
See Brief of Respondent, at pp. 11-12 and n. 4; Utah Code Ann. 
S 17-7-15 (1988) (school district property exempt from 
improvement district assessments). The County goes on to argue, 
in essence, that it can achieve exactly the same end under the 
County Flood Control Ordinance by establishing "County Drainage 
System Benefitted Areas" rather than improvement districts, and 
that this sleight of hand somehow operates to change what 
admittedly would be a prohibited assessment into a "service" fee. 
The drainage fees imposed by the County under its Flood 
Control Ordinance are identical in all relevant respects to the 
special assessments for flood control that could be imposed under 
the County Improvement District Act.— The County admits that 
The Granite School District disputes the County's 
implication that the only "special assessments" under Utah 
law are those fees charged under the authority of Utah Code 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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the Granite School District would be exempt from improvement 
district assessments, and the County's use of a different form to 
achieve the same end of flood and storm drainage control should 
not effect the result. 
Utah's County Improvement District Act and the County's 
Flood Control Ordinance both provide a mechanism for funding the 
capital costs of flood control and drainage facilities. Section 
17-7-4 of the County Improvement District Act provides in 
relevant part as follows: 
(2) The governing body of any Chapter 6 District 
may make or cause to be made any one or a 
combination of the following improvements at any 
place within the boundaries of any Chapter 6 
District, or may on its own initiative by 
ordinance or resolution create special improvement 
districts within the boundaries of the Chapter 6 
District which may make or cause to be made any of 
the"following improvements . . . 
(c) systems for the collection, retention 
and distribution of storm and flood waters. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Ann. § 17-7-6. If this were true, Section 53-4-12 (now 
codified at § 53A-3-408) of the Utah Code would be 
superfluous, as Section 17-7-15 of the County Improvement 
District Act already provides for school district exemption 
from improvement district assessments. Clearly, the term 
"local assessment" under Utah Code Ann. S 53-4-12 is not 
limited to improvement district assessments. Section 
17-7-38 of the Utah Code also expressly provides that 
counties may levy assessments under any other law. 
Nonetheless, the substantive similarity between the drainage 
fees at issue here and permissible flood control assessments 
under the County Improvement District Act compels the 
conclusion that the drainage fees are local assessments from 
which the Granite School District is exempt. 
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Utah Code Ann § 17-7-5(2) (emphasis added). 
The County Improvement District Act goes on to provide 
that counties "may levy assessments on the property within the 
district which is directly or indirectly benefitted by making the 
improvements," for improvements authorized by the Act. Utah Code 
Ann. § 17-7-5(3). All property to be assessed must be included 
within the "special improvement district," but not all property 
within a district must be assessed. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-7-5(1)(c). The assessment may be calculated in any number 
of ways; however, only property within the special improvement 
district that is indirectly or directly "benefitted" by an 
improvement may be assessed, and the amount of the assessment 
must be calculated in proportion to the benefit received by the 
particular property. Utah Code Ann. § 17-7-16. Assessment 
proceeds must be kept separate from the general fund and can be 
used only for the designated improvements. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 17-7-26. 
The County appears to claim that the drainage fees 
imposed under the County Flood Control Ordinance are somehow 
substantively different than what would admittedly be special 
assessments if imposed under the County Improvement District Act 
as described above. Although the County identifies a number of 
alleged distinctions between the special assessments it could 
make under the County Improvement District Act, and the drainage 
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irrelevant or incorrect. The County's arguments are addressed 
below. 
A. Special Assessments are not True Taxes, and May be 
Imposed Under the Police Power. 
First, the County argues that the drainage fees at 
issue here are imposed under the police power, while special 
assessments such as those authorized under the County Improvement 
District Act are an exercise of the taxing power. From this 
premise, the County concludes that because the drainage fees are 
not "taxes," they are also not special or local assessments. The 
County's premise is simply incorrect. 
The Granite School District submits that the authority 
to establish special improvement districts under the County 
Improvement District Act and impose "assessments" thereunder is 
derived from the "police power," not from the constitutional 
taxing power. It is well established that special assessments 
are not true exercises of the taxing power. See Wey v. Salt Lake 
City, 35 Utah 504, 101 P. 381, 381-82 (1909) (recognizing that a 
special assessment is technically not a tax under the Utah 
Constitution); see Brief of Joint Appellants, at p. 26 note 13. 
Ordinances establishing special improvement districts for flood 
and drainage control, sewage treatment and other typical purposes 
are designed to protect the general health and welfare and are 
considered permissible exercises of the police power. See 
generally, 25 Am. Jur. 2d Drains and Drainage Districts SS 2-3 
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(1966) (the power to provide for drainage and sewage improvements 
is an exercise of the police power); Donnelly v. Decker, 58 Wis. 
461, 17 N.W. 389 (1883) (special assessments for drainage 
improvements in proportion to the benefits conferred cannot be 
sustained under the taxing power, but may be a permissible 
exercise of the police power). 
The County cites the cases of Call v. West Jordan, 606 
P.2d 217 (Utah 1979), on rehearing 614 P.2d 1257 (1980); and 
Banberry Development Corp. v. City of South Jordan, 631 P.2d 899 
(Utah 1981) for the proposition that certain fees for 
improvements imposed on developers are not prohibited taxes but 
are permissible exercises of the police power. The County 
appears to argue that because these cases establish that 
developers can be charged certain fees under the police power, it 
therefore follows that all fees charged to developers are not 
local assessments within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. S 53-4-12. 
These cases simply do not support this conclusion, however. 
In the Call case, an ordinance requiring developers to 
pay certain amounts to the city to be used for flood control, or 
recreation facilities was challenged as being outside the city's 
powers. Specifically, the plaintiff developer argued that the 
fees were an unlawful tax and that the city was really attempting 
to exercise the powers of eminent domain without following the 
proper procedures. Call, 606 P.2d at 218. The Court merely held 
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that the ordinance was within the city's police powers and that 
the fees imposed thereunder were not a prohibited tax. Icl. at 
219. On rehearing, the Court held that fees imposed under the 
ordinance were permissible if they could reasonably be attributed 
to public needs created by the development. Call, 614 P.2d 1257 
(Utah 1980) . 
Call did not involve the question of whether the fees 
were a local assessment from which school districts are exempt 
under Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-12, which is the only issue before 
this Court. Likewise, in Banberry Development Corp. v. South 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981), also relied on by the 
County, the issue was whether certain fees imposed on developers 
were a permissible exercise of municipal power — not whether 
such fees constituted local assessments under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 53-4-12. In short, the County's reliance on Banberry and Call 
appears to be based on a mistaken belief that if a fee is not a 
tax and is imposed under the police power, a fortiori it is not a 
special or local assessment. The Granite School District agrees 
that the drainage fees at issue are not true "taxes" and are at 
least arguably imposed through an exercise of the County's police 
power. These facts simply do not determine whether the drainage 
fees are local assessments, however. See Opening Brief of Joint 
Appellants, at p. 6 note 13. 
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B. The Drainage Fees are Special Assessments Because They 
are Imposed on Property Benefitted by the County 
Drainage System. 
The County also argues in Point II of its Brief that 
the drainage fees are not special assessments because the fees 
are not imposed on all land within a special improvement 
district, but are only imposed on developers that make 
improvements which generate excess runoff. However, the County 
is incorrect in asserting that the drainage fees are only imposed 
on developers. Moreover, the drainage fees, like special 
assessments under the County Improvement District Act, are 
designed and intended to approximate the benefit derived by a 
particular property from the County Drainage System. 
1. All Property in the CDS Benefitted Area is Subject 
to the Drainage Fees. 
Under the County Flood Control Ordinance, all property 
2/ in the CDS Benefitted Area- is subject to drainage fees unless 
removed by formal petition of the owner; and the amount of the 
Section 7-5-8.4 of the Ordinance defines the "CDS Benefitted 
Area" as follows: 
[designation of County Drainage System Benefitted 
Area. The Division shall designate the area to be 
served by the intermediate or major drainage 
system facilities to be constructed by the County. 
The drainage basin or area shall be designated in 
a manner consistent with the provisions of Section 
7-5-5. The drainage basin or area so designated 
shall be referred to as the CDS (County Drainage 
System) Benefitted Area. 
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the drainage fees is based on a formula that assumes that all 
property in the CDS Benefitted Area will be developed at some 
future time. See Brief of Joint Appellants, at pp. 7-8, 
paragraphs 4 and 7. Section 7-5-8.12 of the Flood Control 
Ordinance provides: 
[notwithstanding the provisions of Section 
7-5-11, any and all land in the CDS Benefitted 
Area shall be subject to the fees designated in 
Section 7-5-8.8. 
Section 7-5-11.7 of the Flood Control Ordinance similarly 
provides that "[l]and located in a County Drainage System 
Benefitted Area . . . shall be subject to the fees imposed by 
Section 7-5-8.8," unless such land is "removed" from the CDS 
Benefitted Area upon petition by the property owner under Section 
7-5-8.5. To obtain removal, an owner must present evidence that 
excess waters will be retained on site, and must make a written 
election that the owner and his assigns will not make 
improvements that will cause excess storm and flood waters to 
3/ drain into the County Drainage System.- In other'words, the 
owner must establish that the property will not benefit from the 
County Drainage System. See County Flood Control Ordinance 
§ 7-5-8.5, R. at 170-170(a). 
Moreover, under the 1986 amendments, all landowners in a CDS 
Benefitted Area, even if not subject to drainage fees as 
calculated under Section 7-5-8.8, must pay certain minimum 
fees to the County based on acreage. See County Flood 
Control Ordinance § 7-5-8.8(a) (as enacted 1986) (entitled 
"minimum fee schedule.") 
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These provisions of the County Flood Control Ordinance 
demonstrate that the drainage fees are not truly imposed only on 
"developers," as the County argues. Although from a timing 
standpoint the drainage fees do not have to be paid until the 
County approves plans for a development on the particular 
property, see Brief of Joint Appellants, at p. 10, paragraph 11, 
the drainage fees are in essence a contingent liability imposed 
on all property in the CDS Benefitted Area, and are calculated on 
this basis. 
2. The Drainage Fees are Imposed on Property that 
Benefits from the County Drainage System. 
The drainage fee provisions of the County Flood Control 
Ordinance are not any different in purpose and effect than the 
special assessment provisions of the County District Improvement 
Act. Under the County District Improvement Act, the amount of an 
assessment must be based on the proportionate benefit that a 
property in the district derives, either directly or indirectly, 
from a particular improvement. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-7-16. 
Similarly, the County has imposed drainage fees under the Flood 
Control Ordinance based on a formula that attempts to determine 
the proportionate benefit that each property will derive from the 
County Drainage System. See County Flood Control Ordinance 
§ 7-5-8.8, R. at 171; Brief of Joint Appellants, at p. 8 
paragraph 7. Since the County Drainage System is designed to 
handle the excess storm and flood waters caused by development, 
-9-
those properties "benefitted" by the improvements are presumably 
those to be developed that will generate such excess flood and 
storm waters. 
Thus, the County's attempt to distinguish the drainage 
fees from special improvement district assessments on the ground 
that the drainage fees are imposed on developers, rather than on 
benefitted properties in a special improvement district, is 
meaningless in view of the nature of the County Drainage System, 
which is avowedly designed and intended to benefit developed 
properties. A "special assessment" under the County Improvement 
District Act can likewise be imposed only on property deriving 
some benefit from the improvement, and the amount of the 
assessment must vary for each property within the special 
improvement district according to the benefit derived. The 
formula for calculating drainage fees under the County Flood 
Control Ordinance conforms (at least in theory) to this standard, 
and the Granite School District must be exempt from the drainage 
fees just as it is exempt from improvement district assessments. 
A contrary holding permits the County to avoid the Granite School 
District's statutory exemption from special and local assessments 
by the mere expedient of manipulating the form of its funding for 
drainage improvements. 
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POINT II 
THE DRAINAGE FEES ARE LOCAL ASSESSMENTS UNDER UTAH CASE 
LAW. 
The Granite School District disagrees with the County's 
interpretation of the Utah cases of McGonaqle, Wey, and Murray 
City contained in Point III of the County's Brief, and refers the 
Court to pages 19-33 of the opening Brief of Joint Appellants, 
which contain a complete discussion of these cases. 
The Granite School District will address a few of the 
collateral points made in Point III of the County's Brief. The 
County again argues that it "could" have created an improvement 
district for flood control, and that any assessments imposed 
thereunder would be "unrelated" to the development of land and 
would, for that reason, be special assessments from which the 
Granite School District would be exempt. The County goes on to 
state on page 17 of its Brief as follows: 
. . . the [drainage] fee is based solely upon the 
impact the development will have on the drainage 
system and not on the status of the property 
itself. This fee is not an assessment against all 
benefitted property within a given area, but 
rather is a development impact fee from which the 
school district is not exempt (emphasis added).!/ 
i/ The result of the County's apparent reasoning that the 
drainage fees are not charged against all benefitted 
properties, but rather are aimed only at developers, is to 
render the Flood Control Ordinance invalid. If the County 
truly takes the position that undeveloped properties in the 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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The County's reasoning as set forth above is hopelessly 
mired in semantics that exalt the form of the drainage fees over 
5/ 
their purpose.- As already discussed, the purported purpose of 
the drainage improvements provided for by the County Flood 
Control Ordinance is to control excess flood and storm waters 
generated by developed properties. It follows that the property 
that will theoretically be "benefitted" by the drainage 
improvements constructed under the Ordinance is developed 
property (or property to be developed). Thus, contrary to the 
County's assertion, the drainage fees are imposed on all 
"benefitted property within a given area."— See Brief of 
Respondent, at p. 17. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
CDS Benefitted Area that are not charged drainage fees also 
"benefit" (directly or indirectly) from the County Drainage 
System, the Flood Control Ordinance is unconstitutionally 
discriminatory. See Lafferty v. Payson City, 642 P.2d 376 
(Utah 1982); Banberry Development Corporation v. South 
Jordan City, 631 P.2d 899 (Utah 1981). 
5/ As already noted,the County is also incorrect in its 
apparent assertion that all property in the CDS Benefitted 
Area is not assessed. As discussed supra at pp. 8-9, all 
property in the CDS Benefitted Area is subject to the 
drainage fees (unless removed from the Area by formal 
petition). 
£/ All property (whether or not actually developed) in the CDS 
Footnote continued on next page. 
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As discussed in detail in Granite School District's 
opening Brief, the test of a special assessment is whether the 
purpose of the fee is to defray the cost of constructing 
improvements that directly or indirectly benefit a particular 
property. See Brief of Joint Appellants, at pp. 34-36. Indeed, 
the very nature of a special assessment is that it is not charged 
to all property owners uniformly, but only to those deriving some 
special benefit from the improvement. See Northwestern Mutual 
Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 73 Cal. App. 2d 
548, 166 P.2d 917, 930 (Cal. Ct. App. 1946) (relied on by the 
Utah Supreme Court in Murray City); Solvanq Municipal Improvement 
Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. 
Rptrc 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Brief of Joint Appellants, at pp. 
34-43. 
Assessing drainage fees according to the projected 
"use" of the County Drainage System is simply one way of 
quantifying the "benefit" derived from the drainage system by a 
particular property. See, e.g. Solvanq Municipal Improvement 
Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal. App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. 
Footnote continued from previous page. 
Benefitted Area is subject to the drainage fees unless and 
until it is demonstrated that the property will not derive 
any benefit from the County Drainage System. In essence, 
the Ordinance contains a presumption that all property will 
be developed and thereby benefitted, which must be overcome 
by the property owner. See supra pp. 8-9. 
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Rptr. 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980) (upholding as special assessments 
charges based on the projected "use" of the parking facilities to 
be constructed). It is clear that special assessments may be 
calculated based on anticipated usage without changing their 
essential character as special assessments designed to 
approximate the "benefit" to property by reason of a particular 
improvement. See Regents of California v. City of Los Angeles, 
100 Cal. App. 3d 547, 160 Cal. Rptr. 925 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); 
San Marcos Water Dist. v. San Marcos Unified School Dist., 42 
Cal. 3d 154, 228 Cal. Rptr. 47, 720 P.2d 935 (1986); Solvang 
Municipal Improvement Dist. v. Board of Supervisors, 112 Cal. 
App. 3d 545, 169 Cal. Rptr. 391 (Cal. Ct. App. 1980); Brief of 
Joint Appellants at 33-43. 
POINT III 
UTAH CASE LAW UPHOLDING DEVELOPER FEES AS A PERMISSIBLE 
EXERCISE OF THE POLICE POWER IS IRRELEVANT. 
On pages 17-18 of its Brief, the County again argues 
that the Call and Banberry cases establish that the drainage fees 
are not local assessments. As already noted, these cases hold 
merely that certain fees imposed on developers are not prohibited 
taxes, and do not address the issue of whether such fees would 
constitute a local assessment under Utah Code Ann. S 53-4-12. 
See supra at pp. 6-8. 
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The County also argues that the Utah case of 
Homebuilders Assfn. of Greater Salt Lake v. Provo City, 503 P.2d 
451 (1972) establishes that the drainage fees are not local 
assessments within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 53-4-12. In 
Homebuilders, the issue was whether a "sewer connection fee" was 
a permissible "service" charge under Section 10-8-38 of the Utah 
Code, which expressly permitted municipalities to charge fees for 
the use of a sewer system in order to defray capital expenditures 
for the cost of constructing the system. The Homebuilders court 
merely reiterated its Murray City holding that the connection fee 
was a reasonable "service" charge under Section 10-8-38 imposed 
for the right to connect to and use the sewer system. As already 
discussed at length in the Granite School District's Brief, the 
Murray City holding cannot be applied to the drainage fees at 
issue here. See Brief of Joint Appellants, at pp. 24-27, 29-33. 
POINT IV 
NEWLY ENACTED UTAH CODE ANN. S 53A-2Q-1Q7(5) DOES NOT 
APPLY. 
The County argues in Point V of its Brief that because 
the drainage fees would allegedly be permitted under 
newly-enacted Utah Code Ann. § 53A-20-107(5) if this Section were 
applied, the fees cannot be "local assessments" under Utah Code 
Ann. S 53-4-12 (now S 53A-3-408). The County reasons that this 
Court must assume that the legislature intended the two Sections 
to be consistent, and therefore must rule that the drainage fees 
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are not local assessments if they would fall under Section 
53A-20-107(5). However, the drainage fees at issue here would 
not fall under Section 53A-20-107(5) even if that Section were 
applied; therefore, no potential conflict exists if the drainage 
fees are held to be local assessments. 
Section 53A-20-107(5) reads in relevant part as 
follows: 
[a] school district is subject to the applicable 
local governmental entity's planning and zoning 
requirements under Section 11-16-1, except that a 
local government entity may not: 
(3) require a district to pay fees not authorized 
by this chapter; . • . 
(5) require a district to pay any impact fee for 
improvements not reasonably related to the impact 
of the project on the need which the improvement 
is designed to address. 
Utah Code Ann. S 53A-20-107 (emphasis added). 
It is clear from the statutory language emphasized 
above that Section 53A-20-107 does not by itself grant any 
authority to the County to impose so-called "impact" fees on 
school districts. Rather, the Section merely provides that 
school districts are subject to "planning and zoning requirements 
under Section 11-16-1," unless specifically excepted. Thus, if a 
particular fee is not a part of the County's planning and zoning 
requirements under Section 11-16-1, the "impact fee" exception 
contained in subsection 5 of Section 53A-20-107 never comes into 
play. 
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Section 11-16-1 of the Utah Code provides in relevant 
part as follows: 
11-16-1 Political Subdivisions to conform to 
zoning ordinances — remedies for violations. 
No county, municipality, school district . . . 
shall fail to conform to the zoning ordinances of 
another municipality or county by installing, 
constructing, operating, or otherwise using any 
area, land, or building situated within such zoned 
county or municipality in a manner or for a 
purpose which does not conform to said zoning 
ordinance. . . . 
Utah Code Ann. § 11-16-1. The County's statutory authority to 
enact zoning ordinances within the meaning of Section 11-16-1 is 
contained in Chapter 27 of Title 17 of the Utah Code, entitled 
"Zoning and Planning." 
Significantly, there is no mention of or authority 
given to the County for flood control or drainage improvements in 
the "Zoning and Planning" Chapter of the Utah Code. More 
importantly, the County has not even purported to enact the 
County Flood Control Ordinance as a "zoning" ordinance. The Salt 
Lake County Code of Ordinances contains a separate title on 
"Zoning," containing all county ordinances relating to zoning as 
authorized under Chapter 27, Title 17 of the Utah Code. See 
Zoning, Title 19, Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances (1988). 
The County Flood Control Ordinance appears as part of a separate 
title in the County Code, entitled "Flood Control and Water 
Quality," Title 17, Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances. Section 
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17.04.010 of Title 17 of the Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances 
provides as follows: 
[t]here is created within the department of public 
works of the county a flood control and water 
quality division. . . . The division shall, 
through the director of public works, assist the 
board of county commissioners in the discharge of 
its responsibilities to gather, control and 
dispose of storm drainage and floodwater. . . . 
Flood Control and Water Quality, Title 17, Chapter 17.04, Section 
17.04.010, Salt Lake County Code of Ordinances. 
The County Flood Control Ordinance is clearly not a 
zoning or planning ordinance as contemplated by Section 11-16-1 
of the Utah Code; rather, it is a comprehensive and complex 
drainage control system administered by the County Department of 
Public Works. Therefore, the drainage fees required by the 
County Flood Control Ordinance do not fall under Section 
53A-20-107, and the "impact fee" exception contained in Section 
53A-20-107(5) does not apply. Accordingly, the County's argument 
in Point V of its Brief should be rejected by this Court. 
POINT V 
CONCLUSION. 
As discussed at length in the Granite School District's 
opening Brief, the drainage fees imposed by the County Flood 
Control Ordinance are clearly local assessments under Utah law 
and the law of other jurisdictions. Moreover, as discussed in 
this Reply Brief, the drainage fees are the substantive 
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equivalent of "special assessments" for drainage control that the 
County could impose under the authority of Utah's County 
Improvement District Act. The County admits that had it elected 
to fund its drainage facilities by establishing a special 
improvement district under that Act, Granite would be exempt from 
any assessments imposed thereunder. The County's election to use 
a different form of funding for drainage and flood control 
facilities does not alter the essential character of the drainage 
fees as typical local assessments, from which the Granite School 
District is exempt. 
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